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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis defends a weak version of the superiority theory of humor: the superiority 
theory explains some instances of humor better than the incongruity theory. This thesis features 
an overview of the philosophy of humor in ancient, modern, and contemporary philosophy; this 
section contains criticisms of the incongruity theory. Connections between the superiority theory 
and humor about death are explored. Parallels are then drawn between this type of humor and 
Aristotle's great-souled man. A new type of laughter, jubilant laughter, is subsequently identified 
as being similar to laughter classified under the superiority theory since both exhibit a triumphant 
quality. But there is an important difference between the two: humor classified under the 
superiority theory involves a comparison with others while jubilant laughter does not. Finally, 
the implications of the superiority theory on the ethics of humor are examined, and ethical norms 
are adapted from Aristotle's account of the great-souled man.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In this paper I will be writing about humor as a philosophical topic. I will give an 
overview of what ancient, modern, and contemporary philosophers have had to say about humor 
and offer some criticisms of their views (particularly those subscribing to the incongruity theory 
which holds that humor results from a discrepancy between our rational expectation and what 
actually occurs). I will then be arguing in favor of a weak version of the superiority theory. The 
superiority theory holds that we laugh because we see ourselves as superior to other people or 
things; the weak version is that the superiority theory explains many, but not all, instances of 
laughter. Although my primary aim in this paper is descriptive, I do address the ethical 
implications of the superiority theory's role in humor in the final section of the paper. 
 The superiority theory has received little attention (aside from criticisms) in the past few 
hundred years, but I will argue that it explains numerous instances of humor that the popular 
incongruity theory fails to fully explain. I will do this, in part, by drawing upon examples from 
both art and life. I will then discuss the connection between the superiority theory and jokes 
about death as well as how the attitude one possesses in such situations relates to Aristotle's 
great-souled man. 
 I then present a new type of laughter, which I term jubilant laughter, which has not been 
addressed before in the philosophy of humor. This is the type of laughter one experiences when 
"all is right in the world." I argue that this type of laughter is similar to the laughter captured by 
the superiority theory since both express a feeling of triumph, but while the latter involves a 
comparison of oneself with someone or something, the former does not.  
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II. HUMOR AS A PHILOSOPHICAL TOPIC 
 
 Philosophers have paid relatively little attention to humor. This is unfortunate since 
humor is an important part of life. Humor plays an important role in relationships: most people 
arguably place a high value on the character trait of humor when looking for friends or a 
romantic partner. Comedy constitutes a significant portion of art: there are numerous movies, 
television series, books, etc. that fall into the genre of comedy. Humor also plays an important 
role in human beings' emotional lives; when faced with tragedy or depression, people often 
utilize humor to help alleviate the emotional toll of the situation.
1
 Also, humor and laughter are 
uniquely human.
2
 Aristotle's observation is correct: man is the "only animal that laughs" 
(673a5).
3
 
 Humor is clearly an important aspect of life, but is it a topic for philosophical 
consideration? It is for several reasons. First of all, this topic plays a role in two branches of 
philosophy: ethics and aesthetics. When is it immoral to laugh or to find something funny? Is 
humor a part of the good life? Since comedy constitutes a large percentage of art, aesthetics is 
concerned with humor as well. But before the ethical and aesthetic components of humor can be 
addressed, one must know what humor is and why we find certain things humorous. Analyzing 
this concept falls within philosophy's province. Finally, there is a sense in which humor is like 
                                                             
 1 Whether or not a person ought to laugh at a tragic occurrence just to make themselves feel better is an 
issue for the ethics of humor—a topic which I will address in a later section of this paper. 
 
 2 Some animals do engage in behavior that resembles laughter; one could even go so far as to say that these 
animals laugh, but these animals' laughter is not humorous laughter. 
 
 3 Aristotle, Parts of Animals, trans. W. Ogle, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 1049. 
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philosophy. Morreall relays the following quote from William James, who said that philosophy 
"sees the familiar as if it were strange, and the strange as if it were familiar."
4
 Humor does the 
same thing; for example, the popular sitcom Seinfeld took many instances from everyday life, 
such as waiting for a table at a restaurant or forgetting where you parked your car, and caused us 
to look at these things differently. Philosophy also causes us to look at the world differently. The 
similarity between humor and philosophy will be addressed further in a later section. 
 Differentiating humor from laughter is important. A person can laugh without finding 
anything humorous (e.g. a person being tickled; an actor laughing; etc.), so laughter without 
humor is possible. Also, a person can find something humorous and not laugh; sometimes when 
we find something humorous we only smile. While it is often the case that finding something 
funny causes one to laugh, humor is not reducible to laughter since we do not always laugh when 
we find something funny. Throughout the rest of this paper when I use the word laughter I will 
be referring to humorous laughter unless I specify otherwise. It is important to note something 
that Morreall points out: the word humor was not used to indicate something funny until the 18th 
century.
5
 So in the next section when I discuss ancient and early modern philosophers' views on 
"humor" I will actually be discussing their views on laughter and comedy, but the sort of 
laughter that all of them are referring to is humorous laughter (unless I indicate otherwise). 
 While the distinction between the laughter and humor is usually accepted, Joshua Shaw 
has recently argued against it.
6
 Shaw suggests that the widely-held view that humor is distinct 
                                                             
 4 John Morreall, "Philosophy of Humor," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), 
ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified December 31, 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/humor/. 
 
 5 Ibid. 
 
 6 Joshua Shaw, "Philosophy of Humor," Philosophy Compass 5, no. 2 (2010): 119, doi: 10.1111/j.1747-
9991.2009.00281.x. 
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from laughter presupposes a cognitivist view of emotion.
7
 Shaw argues that humor is not as 
"cognitively laden" as most people suggest.
8
 Shaw gives several examples where individuals are 
presumably experiencing humor but are not engaging in a cognitive appraisal of the situation 
(e.g. a one-year-old laughing at a pratfall or a silly voice).
9
 Shaw thinks that humor is best 
explained by reference to "feelings of mirth" or an "emotion of humorous amusement" which are 
explained "in terms of one's internal experience of certain bodily states."
10
 Shaw thinks that 
laughter helps us identify "the bodily states that typify humorous amusement" and that in this 
way "humor may not be separable from laughter."
11
 
 While Shaw is correct when he states that laughter helps us identify humorous states, he 
unnecessarily downplays the cognitive explanation of humor. The cognitive capabilities of a one-
year-old are quite limited; but, arguably, they do possess enough cognitive ability to find some 
things humorous. One-year-old human beings laugh at pratfalls and similar silly behavior while 
mature animals of other species do not. A one-year-old's laughing at a pratfall, a silly voice, etc., 
is successfully explained by the incongruity theory (which is outlined in the next section).
12
  
                                                             
 7 Ibid., 120. 
 
 8 Ibid., 121. 
 
 9 Ibid. 
 
 10 Ibid., 122. 
 
 11 Ibid. 
 
 12 A one-year-old (or other similarly young child) has had enough experiences to come to expect a 
regularity of certain occurrences; when such regularities are violated in a way that does not harm the child, then the 
child will be amused (e.g. a child is used to seeing an adult successfully cross a room, so when the adult performs a 
melodramatic fall the child is pleasantly surprised by this unusual event). 
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III. THE HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMOR 
 
 Plato was the first philosopher to address the issue of humor. In his dialogue Philebus, 
Socrates argues that humor involves a mixture of pain and pleasure (48a).
13,
 
14
 Socrates argues 
that ridiculousness is a certain kind of vice wherein a person misjudges himself; he imagines 
himself to be wealthier, more attractive, or more virtuous than he actually is (48c-e). Socrates 
then distinguishes between powerful people who misjudge themselves and weak people who 
misjudge themselves; he asserts that only the latter group are ridiculous because they do not have 
the power to avenge themselves when ridiculed (49b-c). The former group, however, do have the 
ability to avenge themselves and are, therefore, not ridiculous but odious (49b-c). So, for 
Socrates, ridiculousness gives rise to humor. He then goes on to make a further distinction 
between rejoicing at an enemy's misfortunes, which is a good thing, and laughing at a friend's 
misfortune, which is wrong (49d-e).
15
 Socrates summarizes his argument as follows: "if we laugh 
at what is ridiculous about our friends, by mixing pleasure with malice, we thereby mix pleasure 
with pain. For we had agreed earlier that malice is a pain in the soul, that laughing is a pleasure, 
and that both occur together on those occasions" (50a).
16
 This view has come to be classified as 
                                                             
 13 Plato, Philebus, trans. Dorothea Frede, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 437. 
 
 14 Socrates uses the word "comedy" in the translation I am using. He is referring to plays (he and Protarchus 
are discussing tragedies prior to this section), but the examples he uses later refer not to plays but to other comedic 
instances. Since this is the case, I have opted for the synonymous word "humor" in order to be consistent with the 
rest of this paper. 
 
 15 The text is not clear on the issue of whether or not Socrates thought rejoicing at an enemy's misfortune 
was an instance of humor. 
 
 16 Ibid., 439. 
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the superiority theory of humor: when a person laughs they do so because they view themselves 
as superior to the person or thing that they are laughing about. 
 Plato's view that humor contains a malicious element caused him to have a negative view 
of humor. In The Republic Plato has the following to say about laughter: "[The Guardians] 
mustn't be lovers of laughter either, for whenever anyone indulges in violent laughter, a violent 
change of mood is likely to follow" (388e).
17
 Plato is even harsher in the Laws where he writes 
the following: "No composer of comedies, or of songs or iambic verse, must ever be allowed to 
ridicule either by description or by impersonation any citizen whatever, with or without rancor. 
Anyone who disobeys this rule must be ejected from the country" (935e).
18
 This negative 
characterization of laughter had a lasting impact upon Western culture; John Morreall writes, 
"Bringing together negative assessments of laughter from the Bible with criticisms from Greek 
philosophy, early Christian leaders such as Ambrose, Jerome, Basil, Ephraim, and John 
Chrysostom warned against either excessive laughter or laughter generally."
19
 
 It would be unfair to ascribe a full-fledged theory of humor to Plato; all of his references 
to humor occur in passing and are very brief in comparison to other discussions in his dialogues. 
It is also unclear if Plato equated laugher with humor; he makes no distinction in his dialogues, 
but there is no good reason to assume that he necessarily equated the two. Although Plato did not 
develop a complete theory of humor, it safe to assume that Plato believed humor always 
contained an element of malice based on the information that we do have. I disagree with Plato 
                                                             
 17 Plato, The Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube, revs. C.D.C. Reeves, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. 
Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 1026. 
 
 18 Plato, Laws, trans. Trevor J. Saunders, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 1588. 
 
 
19
 Morreall, "Philosophy of Humor". 
 
 
 
7 
 
on this point; my reasons for disagreeing with him will become evident later in the paper, and 
other reasons for rejecting Plato's view on this point will emerge shortly. 
 Aristotle also addressed the issue of humor. To an extent, Aristotle's views align with 
Plato's; Aristotle refers to wit as "well-bred insolence" (Rhetoric II.12, 1389b11).
20, 21
 This 
corresponds with Plato's view that humor involves malice. Aristotle also writes, "The ridiculous 
may be defined as a mistake or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others" (Poetics 5, 
1449a35).
22
 Aristotle gives the example of someone wearing a mask that makes her face look 
ugly and deformed; such a mask excites laughter, but the individual wearing the mask is not in 
pain. This view of Aristotle's reflects Plato's view that we laugh at harmless forms of self-
ignorance. Aristotle suggests that perhaps lawmakers should have outlawed jests since they are a 
type of abuse (Nicomachean Ethics IV.8, 1128a29-31).
23
 But, overall, Aristotle has a much more 
positive attitude towards humor than Plato did. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle lists wit as a 
virtue (IV.8). Aristotle applies his virtue of the mean to humor; on one end there are vulgar 
buffoons, and on the other end there are boorish people who can neither make nor take jokes. 
The virtuous person jokes in a tasteful manner; what Aristotle means by this is that the virtuous 
person's jokes do not cause pain in the listener, whereas the buffoon's jokes do. Aristotle 
censures the buffoon for "striving after humor at all costs, and aiming rather at raising a laugh 
                                                             
 20Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 2214. 
 
 21 I take wit to be a species of humor.  
 
 22 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. I. Bywater, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 2319. 
 
 23 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, revs. J.O. Urmson, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, 
ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 1780. 
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than at saying what is becoming and at avoiding pain to the object of their fun" (1128a5-7).
24
 
The virtuous person's jokes entertain the listener without causing them pain; the boor fails to 
entertain the listener. Everything that I have cited from Aristotle so far indicates that he is a 
superiority theorist, but Aristotle is also the first philosopher to put forth incongruity as an 
explanation of humor. In his discussion of metaphors, Aristotle notes that a writer can make a 
joke by using a word that does not fit the audiences' expectation (Rhetoric III.11, 1412a25-
b30).
25
 
 Descartes adopted a position similar to Plato's and Aristotle's. He wrote that the surprise 
of noticing some small evil in a person deserving of such causes us to laugh; likewise, we will 
laugh at a great evil befalling someone we hate (The Passions of the Soul Article 178).
26
 
Descartes' view is reminiscent of Plato's view that laughing at an enemy's misfortune is a good 
thing. In connection with this point, Descartes makes an interesting claim that people who are 
lame or blind are especially given to mockery since they desire others to be brought down to 
their level (Article 179).
27
 Like Aristotle, Descartes also has something positive to say about 
humor; he writes: "As regards the modest bantering which is useful in reproving vices by making 
them appear ridiculous, [... this is] a quality pertaining to the well disposed man which gives 
evidence of the gaiety of his temper and the tranquility of his soul, which are characteristic 
marks of virtue; it often also shows the ingenuity of his mind in knowing how to present an 
                                                             
 24 Ibid. 
 
 25 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 2253-2255. 
 
 26 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, trans. Elizabeth Haldane and G. Ross, in The Philosophy of 
Laughter and Humor, ed. John Morreall (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 24. 
  
 27 Ibid. 
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agreeable appearance to the things which he ridicules" (Article 180).
28
 Descartes gives no 
example of ridicule that has "an agreeable appearance." Although he is referring to instances in 
interpersonal scenarios, I am reminded of sitcoms such as The Andy Griffith Show and The Cosby 
Show which often taught moral lessons through humor. That method of conveying a moral point 
is often more effective than a solemn lecture because while the latter can seem condescending 
the former is affable; and this, I would argue, is Descartes' point. 
 Another modern philosopher who tackled the subject of humor was Thomas Hobbes. 
Hobbes believed "that the passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some 
sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or 
with our own formerly" (Human Nature, ch. 8, §13).
29
 In other words, all cases of laughter (or 
humor) involve us asserting our superiority over someone or something. Hobbes' view was later 
criticized by Francis Hutcheson. 
 Hutcheson first criticized Hobbes' view by citing several counterexamples where people 
laugh but yet do not experience a sense of superiority: one example he cites is witticisms in 
poetry.
30
 His second line of criticism, which I find more compelling, is to note that even when 
we do feel superior to someone we do not always react with laughter; Hutcheson writes: 
It must be a very merry state in which a fine gentleman is, when well dressed, in his 
coach, he passes our streets, where he will see so many ragged beggars, and porters, and 
chairmen sweating at their labor, on every side of him. It is a great pity that we had not an 
infirmary or lazar-house to retire to in cloudy weather, to get an afternoon of laughter at 
these inferior objects: Strange! – that none of our Hobbists banish all canary birds and 
                                                             
 28 Ibid. 
 
 29 Thomas Hobbes, Human Nature, in The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, ed. John Morreall (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1987), 20. 
 
 30 Francis Hutcheson, Reflections Upon Laughter, in The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, ed. John 
Morreall (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 27-28. 
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squirrels, and lap-dogs, and pugs, and cats out of their houses, and substitute in their 
place asses, and owls, and snails, and oysters to be merry upon.
31
 
 
Hutcheson goes on to note that in many cases where we are superior to the person we perceive 
our reaction is often compassion and sorrow, not laughter.
32
 Hutcheson then suggests that 
laughter is caused by a contrast between ideas.
33
 Finally, Hutcheson touches upon the various 
functions of humor: a bond in friendship, a gentle method of rebuke, etc.
34
 
 Hutcheson is an early proponent of the view which would later come to be called the 
incongruity theory. One interesting example he offers is the sight of a person who makes a 
mistake in speech or action; Hutcheson contends that we laugh at these instances because we 
associate the idea of a human being with wisdom and dignity, and these ideas contrast with the 
mistake the person just made.
35
 Hutcheson concedes that in these situations there is "an opinion 
of superiority in the laughter," but he thinks that is not the true cause of the laughter for we can 
laugh at someone who we hold in high esteem when they make a mistake without diminishing 
our high regard for that person.
36
 Hutcheson's observation that we can laugh at someone we 
admire without losing respect for that person is correct, but that does not mean that the 
superiority theory fails to explain such cases. There is a limited sense in which we regard 
ourselves as superior to the person we laugh at in such cases (even if we generally hold them as 
being superior to ourselves): we imagine that had we been in the same position as that person we 
                                                             
 31 Ibid., 29. 
 
 32 Ibid. 
 
 33 Ibid., 32. 
 
 34 Ibid., 35-40. 
 
 35 Ibid., 33. 
 
 36 Ibid., 33-34. 
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would not have made the mistake that he or she did. Likewise, when we laugh at ourselves we do 
so because we now realize something that our past self did not. For example, I might look all 
over my apartment for my car keys only to realize that the keys are in the most obvious of all 
places: my pocket. I might then have a laugh at my former state of ignorance ("What an idiot I 
was!"). Hobbes pointed this out when he wrote that laughter arises from "some sudden 
conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with 
our own formerly: for men laugh at the follies of themselves past [emphasis added]."
37
 
 The next major philosopher who addressed the issue of humor was Immanuel Kant; he 
also happens to be the first major proponent of the incongruity theory. Kant held that the 
pleasure of laughter was "merely bodily, although it is excited by the ideas of the mind" 
(Critique of Judgment, Part I, Div. 1, 54).
38
 Kant's explanation of humor is partly psychological 
and partly physiological. Kant held that when we are listening to a joke our rational faculty is 
engaged, but when the punch line is delivered it defies our expectations so that the mental energy 
we were expending is suddenly stopped short; Kant writes, "we feel the effect of this slackening 
in the body by the oscillation of the organs."
39
 Kant notes that the cause of laughter necessarily 
involves an absurdity; and, since absurdity is the cause, the understanding "can find no 
satisfaction."
40
 
 Kant relays the following joke and then gives an explanation of how his theory accounts 
for our amusement: 
                                                             
 37 Hobbes, Human Nature, 20. 
 
 
38
 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J.H. Bernard, in The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, 
ed. John Morreall (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 46. 
 
 39 Ibid., 47. 
 
 40 Ibid. 
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Suppose this story to be told: an Indian at the table of an Englishman in Surat, when he 
saw a bottle of ale opened and overflowing, testified his great astonishment with many 
exclamations. When the Englishman asked him, "What is there in this to astonish you so 
much?" he answered, "I am not at all astonished that it should flow out, but I do wonder 
how you ever got it in." At this story we laugh, and it gives us hearty pleasure; not 
because we deem ourselves cleverer than this ignorant man [emphasis added], or because 
of anything in it that we note as satisfactory to the understanding, but because our 
expectation was strained [for a time] and then was suddenly dissipated into nothing.
41
 
 
I am not convinced by Kant's dismissal of the alternate take on why this joke is funny: that we 
laugh at the joke because we see ourselves as superior to the Indian who is ignorant of 
carbonation. Might not there be something to the superiority theory's take on this joke? I think 
that there is. 
  Kant is also wrong when he states that the pleasure of humor is "merely bodily." While 
we clearly derive bodily pleasure from laughter, there also is an intellectual component to the 
appreciation of humor as well. Criticizing Kant on this point is tricky since he does not 
completely deny that the intellect is involved in the process of enjoying humor; but Kant 
understates the role of the intellect in this regard since, on his account, the intellect's role ceases 
once the punch line is told. This is contrary to the evidence; there are occasions when I enjoy a 
joke but do not laugh. I might smile or even chuckle but I'm certainly not laughing so heavily 
that my organs oscillate. In these cases where one mildly enjoys humor, the body is affected very 
slightly (perhaps even not at all in some cases); so the enjoyment of the humor must be 
intellectual in nature. In cases where one is having a good belly laugh, I see no reason to think 
that the intellectual component of enjoyment is decreased simply because the physical aspect of 
enjoyment has increased. Perhaps in cases of hearty laughter the intellectual aspect of enjoyment 
is even greater than in cases where one only smiles at a joke. 
                                                             
 41 Ibid., 47-48. 
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 One might object that in cases where one only chuckles or smiles at a joke the physical 
effects of humor are simply more subtle. This is a compelling possibility, so I will now raise 
another objection to Kant's account which demonstrates the intellect's role in the appreciation of 
humor and thereby strengthens my first objection. We can find jokes funny even after hearing 
them multiple times (arguably some jokes become even funnier with each successive telling). On 
Kant's account laughter is caused by the expectation of our understanding being defied and the 
sudden transformation which follows the understanding suddenly stopping short. I see how this 
account can, to an extent, capture our experience the first time we hear a joke, but when we 
subsequently hear the same joke and laugh at it our expectations our not defied: we already know 
the punchline. Our understanding now knows what to expect, but this does not diminish our 
enjoyment of the joke, at least in some cases. In such cases, there is still a physical aspect of 
enjoying the joke; but there is reason to believe that one's enjoyment of the joke contains an 
intellectual component as well since the understanding knows what will occur but is still engaged 
in the process (i.e., listening to and appreciating the joke). 
 Arthur Schopenhauer also subscribed to the incongruity theory, but his version is 
significantly different from Kant's. He writes, "The cause of laugher in every case is simply the 
sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects that have been 
thought through it in some relation" (The World as Will and Idea, Book I, §13).
42
 So, according 
to Schopenhauer, humor arises when there is a difference between our conception of a thing and 
what we discover it truly to be through our perception.
43
 Like Kant, Schopenhauer also sees 
                                                             
 42 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, trans. R.B. Haldane and John Kemp, in The 
Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, ed. John Morreall (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 52. 
 
 43 Ibid. 
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humor as possessing an antirational character.
44
 Morreall states that Kant downgrades humor 
because of this quality, giving it a less important role in aesthetics than beauty or the admiration 
of moral goodness.
45
 Schopenhauer, on the other hand, celebrates this supposed quality of 
humor; he writes, "[Perception's] conflict with what is thought springs ultimately from the fact 
that the latter, with its abstract conceptions, cannot get down to the infinite multifariousness and 
fine shades of difference of the concrete."
46
 Schopenhauer tells the following joke as an example 
of his theory of humor: 
In the Berlin theatre he [an actor named Unzelmann] was strictly forbidden to improvise. 
Soon afterwards he had to appear on the stage on horseback, and just as he came on the 
stage the horse dunged, at which the audience began to laugh, but laughed much more 
when Unzelmann said to the horse: "What are you doing? Don't you know that we are 
forbidden to improvise?" Here the subsumption of the heterogeneous under the more 
general context is very distinct, but the witticism is exceedingly happy, and the ludicrous 
effect produced by it excessively strong.
47
 
 
We do not laugh at that anecdote because our rational expectation has been defied; rather, we 
laugh because we know that the horse's action was not an instance of improvisation. The 
incongruity theory does capture some of this anecdote's humor, but the superiority theory also 
explains part of the anecdote's humorous appeal. The actor was improvising when he joked about 
improvisation, and by doing so he was perhaps joking at his boss's expense. The audience 
laughed at this because they, presumably, knew that the actor was being reined in by his boss.
48
 
                                                             
 44 Ibid., 51-52. 
 
 45 John Morreall, The Philosophy o f Laughter and Humor (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1987), 45. 
 
 46 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, 60. 
 
 47 Ibid., 57. 
 
 
48
 I'd also like to add that I find it amusing that Schopenhauer denigrates reason for failing properly to 
subsume all concrete instances since he cites this as evidence in favor of his conceptual theory of humor which is 
supposed to subsume all concrete instances of humor! 
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 Another theory of humor is the relief theory.
49
 Morreall notes that this theory of humor 
was originally put forth by Lord Shaftesbury and was later advocated by Herbert Spencer and 
Sigmund Freud.
50
 This theory holds that humor (particularly laughter) is the result of a release of 
nervous energy. Morreall states that both Spencer's and Freud's theories were based on the 
"hydraulic" theory of psychic energy which enjoyed some popularity during the nineteenth 
century.
51
 Spencer takes an example of laughter caused by incongruity and explains it as follows: 
"A large mass of emotion had been produced; or, to speak in physiological language, a large 
portion of the nervous system was in a state of tension. [...] The excess must therefore discharge 
itself in some other direction; and in the way already explained, there results an efflux through 
the motor nerves to various classes of the muscles, producing the half-convulsive actions we 
term laughter."
52
 Spencer's account is not limited to instances caused by incongruity; he also 
discusses laughter caused by tickling which he sees as also involving "muscular excitement."
53
 
 Freud adopted this account of humor and added his psychoanalytic psychological theory 
to it (e.g. humor serves as an outlet for the energy caused by repressed emotions).
54
 Morreall 
writes that "few contemporary scholars defend the claims of Spencer and Freud that the energy 
expended in laughter is the energy of feeling emotions, the energy of repressing emotions, or the 
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energy of thinking, which have built up and require venting."
55
 This theory has fallen out of 
favor because it is based on the outdated hydraulic view of the nervous system. Also, Freud's 
psychological theory has fallen out of favor; in a New York Times article about the popularity of 
Freud's theory, Patricia Cohen writes, "if you want to learn about psychoanalysis at the nation's 
top universities, one of the last places to look may be the psychology department."
56
 
 In this section I have presented the various philosophers' views as belonging to one of 
three theories: superiority, incongruity, and relief. This is the standard presentation, and it has its 
merits. But I am not sure that the lines are so clear cut. For example, while Aristotle is classified 
as an adherent of the superiority theory, he also states that laughter can be caused by an 
incongruity. Also, while Kant's views are classified under the incongruity theory, his views could 
be construed as a type of relief theory since the energy the intellect was utilizing has a bodily 
manifestation once the intellect's activity ceases. One final example is that while Herbert 
Spencer's views are classified under the relief theory he does hold that humor is related to 
incongruity. There are many other problems like these; I just wanted to indicate that this 
trichotomy might not be entirely accurate. But I presented things under this trichotomy since this 
is the standard way philosopher's views are presented in the literature, and I think that despite its 
problems the theory does have a good deal of merit. 
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IV. CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF HUMOR 
 
 John Morreall put forth a new theory of laughter in his book Taking Laughter Seriously; 
he presents a condensed version of his thesis in A New Theory of Laughter. Morreall's goal is to 
find an explanation for both humorous and non-humorous laughter. Morreall believes that the 
incongruity theory "can account for all cases of humorous laughter."
57
 But Morreall contends 
that incongruity alone cannot explain instances of humor; he writes: "not just any incongruity 
that a person experiences will trigger laughter: the experience must be felt as pleasant by the 
person. An incongruity which evokes negative emotions such as anger, fear, or indignation, will 
not do the trick. If I opened my bathroom door to find a large pumpkin in the bathtub, for 
example, I would probably laugh. But if I found a cougar in the tub, I would not laugh, though 
this situation would be just as incongruous."
58
 So Morreall suggests that "Laughter results from a 
pleasant psychological shift" and humorous laughter results from an incongruity accompanied by 
a pleasant psychological shift.
59
 He believes that all three theories of humor hint at this common 
element of a pleasant psychological shift, but unlike those theories he thinks that his account 
holds true for non-humorous cases of laughter, such as tickling, which also involve pleasant 
psychological shifts.
60
 While Morreall holds that not all laughter is caused by humor, it is unclear 
whether or not he thinks that humor always evokes laughter. I agree with Morreall that laughter 
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results from a pleasant psychological shift, but I disagree with him about all instances of 
humorous laughter being explained through a pleasant psychological shift triggered by an 
incongruity. I will give my reasons for why I disagree with him on this issue in a later section. 
 In Humor and Incongruity, Michael Clark suggests a revised version of the incongruity 
theory. He writes, "amusement is the enjoyment of (perceiving or thinking of or indulging in) 
what is seen as incongruous, partly at least because it is seen as incongruous [emphasis in 
original]."
61
 Clark later writes that he does not know if there are any counterexamples where a 
person enjoys something incongruous but is not amused.
62
 
 I have thought of two counterexamples from film. In Stanley Kubrick's A Clockwork 
Orange the main character, Alex DeLarge (played by Malcolm McDowell), rapes a woman and 
beats her handicapped husband while singing "Singin' in the Rain." The juxtaposition of such a 
cheery tune with a horrific, violent scene is certainly incongruous; and most viewers watch the 
film for the sake of enjoyment.
63
 But the scene is certainly not amusing—it is revolting. Another 
example that comes to mind is David Lynch's Lost Highway. Midway through the film, the main 
character transmogrifies into a different character who is played by a different actor. This event 
is not explained in the film, and the characters in the film are just as puzzled by this occurrence 
as the viewers are. This event is definitely incongruous (not only within the film but also with the 
                                                             
 61 Michael Clark, Humor and Incongruity,  in The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, ed. John Morreall 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 150. 
 
 62 Ibid., 154. 
 
 63 It is difficult to say whether or not viewers enjoy this terrifying scene. On the one hand, the actions 
portrayed in the scene do not excite pleasant emotions but instead give rise to feelings of disgust, hatred, fear, etc. 
But, on the other hand, one can derive pleasure from Kubrick's bold directorial decision to capture such a scene on 
film or the quality of the actor's performances which give the scene such a powerful impact. I think it is in this latter 
sense that a viewer can be understood as enjoying the scene. 
 
 
 
19 
 
traditional structure of films and other forms of storytelling); and, once again, people watch the 
film for the sake of enjoyment. But this incongruous element in the film is not humorous. 
 Ted Cohen takes a very different approach to humor in his book Jokes: Philosophical 
Thoughts on Joking Matters; he does not attempt to explain jokes by reference to any all-
encompassing theory.
64
 So instead of trying to come up with a "theory of joking" Cohen contents 
himself with making a few theoretical observations. Cohen contends that jokes involve intimacy: 
when one person tells another person a joke and this person listening to the joke laughs this 
happens because the person who hears the joke and the person who tells it share a set of 
background beliefs that makes humor possible.
65, 66
 This intimacy not only involves shared 
background beliefs but also the way one feels about something. Cohen gives an analogy about 
Maine's climate during the summer; two people can agree about facts concerning Maine's 
climate, but it is another thing for them to share the view that summer in Maine possesses a 
"beauty that seems dim and fragile."
67
 Agreement over this latter point involves an intimacy that 
is not captured by agreeing on the average high temperature in August in Maine. Cohen states 
that sharing a joke is similar because when we do so we are seeking to connect with other people 
by sharing with them what it is that we find to be funny.
68
 He writes that one cannot prove that a 
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joke is funny in the same way that one can prove the reasoning of an argument is valid.
69
 He 
goes on to say that a person can explain to someone else why he or she finds something funny 
but the two do not reach each other unless they both find the joke amusing.
70
 Another way that 
Cohen puts this point is to say that jokes are conditional which means that they only work with 
certain audiences, and the degree to which a joke is conditional varies.
 71
 Some jokes are 
understood by a wide audience while some jokes are only funny to a select group of people such 
as this joke: "What did Lesniewski say to Lukasiewicz?' 'Logically, we're poles apart.'"
72
 One 
very interesting claim that Cohen makes is that offensive jokes are funny; he holds that we do 
nothing to remedy the situation when we deny this fact.
73
 
 Simon Critchley discusses many aspects of humor, such as its theoretical perspective, in 
his book On Humor. Critchley writes that philosophy and humor share a common attribute: 
detachment from one's immediate experience.
74
 Critchley observes that in this way humor is a 
tool for social criticism; he writes that a "joke shows the sheer contingency or arbitrariness of the 
social rites in which we engage."
75
 He also suggests that humor's aspect of detachment is evident 
in humor that plays on the fact that while human beings have a body they are not their body.
76
  
Critchley goes on to write that comedy allows us to adopt a "theoretical attitude towards the 
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world," but one that is "eminently practical and interesting."
77
 I take Critchley to be saying 
something along the lines of William James quote that I mentioned earlier: humor causes us to 
see the strange as familiar and the familiar as strange, and it is in this sense that humor is 
theoretical. When joking we detach ourselves from the world we inhabit; we are like an outsider 
looking in at a strange world. For example, an adherent of Leibniz's philosophy thinks that the 
world is comprised of "windowless" monads—a strange view indeed! For this person the 
familiar view of the world (naive realism) is strange, and their strange view about monads is 
familiar. Similarly, when we listen to a stand-up comic joke about going to the movies, for 
instance, the comic takes a familiar activity and puts a twist on it or highlights something odd 
about it that we might not have noticed before; and the familiar thereby becomes strange. But 
Critchley thinks humor has an advantage over philosophy; he writes: "Descartes famously and 
perhaps rightly said that one could only do metaphysics for a few hours a year. The great virtue 
of humor is that it is philosophizing in action, a bright silver thread running through the duvet of 
existence. And one can easily engage in it for an hour or two every day."
78
 That is the sense in 
which humor is more practical than philosophy, according to Critchley; joking is easy and fun—
philosophizing, on the other hand, while fun for some, is almost never easy. 
 Critchley follows Cohen by observing that we do sometimes laugh at offensive jokes; he 
writes, "Perhaps one laughs at jokes one would rather not laugh at. Humor can provide 
information about oneself that one would rather not have."
79
 In the book's final chapter, Critchley 
adopts a thoroughly Freudian view of humor and states that "laughter at oneself is better than 
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laughing at others."
80
 I strongly disagree with Critchley's adoption of Freud's views; 
unfortunately, critiquing this lies beyond the scope of this paper since doing so would involve a 
critique of Freud's psychoanalytic psychology. I can say, however, that (in a very specific way) it 
is immoral to laugh at oneself; I will explain what I mean by this in a later section. 
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V. DEFENDING THE SUPERIORITY THEORY 
 
 Aaron Smuts observes that the incongruity theory is the reigning theory of humor today.
81
 
I do not wish to unseat the incongruity theory from the throne—I think it covers many instances 
of humor. Also, I see no reason to be a monist about the philosophy of humor. Instead, I want to 
emphasize the superiority theory which I think has been unduly neglected for the past few 
hundred years. There are many instances of humor which can be explained by both the 
superiority and incongruity theories, but the incongruity theory offers a trivial explanation in 
most cases. In other words, the incongruity theorists' interpretation of these instances cannot be 
definitively refuted, but I will argue that the superiority theory offers a superior interpretation of 
these instances.
82
 
 In the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy's article on humor, Smuts distinguishes two 
forms of the superiority theory: 
We can give two forms to the claims of the superiority theory of humor: (1) the 
strong claim holds that all humor involves a feeling of superiority, and (2) the 
weak claim suggests that feelings of superiority are frequently found in many 
cases of humor.
83
 
 
I agree with Smuts' division and take Hobbes to be representative of the first form since he held 
that humor was "nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some 
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eminency in ourselves."
84
 Aristotle is representative of the second form since he thought that 
some instances of humor resulted from incongruity. I will be defending the second, weak claim 
by presenting several examples from art and showing that the superiority theory explains these 
examples better than the incongruity theory does. 
 Arthur Schopenhauer and George Santayana have both defended readings of Don 
Quixote which support the incongruity theory. Schopenhauer writes, "Most of the actions of Don 
Quixote are also cases in point, for he subsumes the realities he encounters under conceptions 
drawn from the romances of chivalry, from which they are very different."
85
 Santayana describes 
Don Quixote as contradictory; on the one hand, Don Quixote is crazy and old, but on the other 
hand he is courageous, idealistic, and good.
86
 Santayana thinks it is the incongruity between 
these qualities which gives rise to the novel's humor.
87
 While both of these explanations have 
some degree of credibility, they do not fully capture the essence of the humor in Don Quixote. 
For example, the famous section where Don Quixote jousts with the windmills definitely exhibits 
incongruity: he subsumes the reality of the windmills under the conception of giants; and there is 
an incongruity between the concept of jousting, which involves two human beings engaged in 
combat, and his action of trying to joust with inanimate objects. But is the incongruity the sole 
reason for our finding Don Quixote's action funny? No. We laugh at him because he is a fool. 
We laugh at him because he is inferior to us: he mistakes windmills for giants while we do not. 
 Another beloved fool in popular culture is Barney Fife from The Andy Griffith Show. Fife 
is a bumbling deputy sheriff who consistently overestimates his abilities. His inflated opinion of 
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himself does not match up with the reality of who he is; although there is an incongruity here, the 
incongruity as such is not the source of the humor. Imagine that the incongruity was reversed: 
Fife has a low opinion of his skill-level which is, in fact, very high. This inverted version of 
Barney Fife would not be as funny even though his character would still exhibit incongruity. The 
fact that we feel superior to Barney Fife is what makes him funny. 
 My third and final example from art is the character of Gob Bluth from the television 
series Arrested Development. Gob is an incompetent magician who displays a lot of bravado. 
The opening of his magic act is very grandiose—perhaps it would be more accurate to describe it 
as an attempt at grandeur. But the act that follows is always an extreme let-down from the 
opening's implied grandeur. Once again, there is an incongruity here; but the humor of Gob's act 
cannot be explained by an appeal to incongruity alone. If the act's opening was lackluster and 
rest of the act was very impressive, then that would be incongruous; but this inverted act would 
not be very funny.  What makes Gob's act funny is the fact that he is a terrible magician; we 
laugh at him because we feel superior to his incompetence. 
 All three of the characters I have just cited possess a common feature: they lack self-
awareness; Socrates pointed to this fact in his discussion of humor in Philebus. In other words, 
their idea of themselves does not correspond with the reality of who they are. Don Quixote 
thinks that he is a gallant knight, but in reality he is a delusional old man. Barney Fife thinks he 
is a tough and sharp lawman, but in reality he is bumbling and incompetent. Gob Bluth imagines 
himself to be a world-class magician, but in reality he is not fit to perform at a child's birthday 
party. 
 The issue of self-awareness is an important factor in the superiority theory because it is 
self-awareness that makes us superior to these characters. While Don Quixote, Barney Fife, and 
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Gob Bluth are an inferior knight, deputy sheriff, and magician respectively, they still might very 
well be superior in their respective fields to those who laugh at them; in other words, while 
Barney Fife is an incompetent deputy sheriff he is still a more competent deputy sheriff than I 
would be if I were to trade places with him.
88
 But that is not what the superiority theory is 
concerned with in these cases.  We laugh at these characters because we are superior to them on 
the issue of self-awareness. These characters are not aware of the discrepancy between the way 
they see themselves and the way they actually are, but we are aware of this discrepancy.
89
 
 With the three previous examples, I suggested that if the incongruity was reversed, i.e., if 
the person appeared to be incompetent but was actually competent, the scenario would not be 
funny (or, at least, it would not be as funny). Someone might object that some instances of this 
reversed incongruity might be funny; for example, the television series Columbo featured a 
brilliant police detective who appeared to a bumbling incompetent. Columbo is the opposite of 
Barney Fife. The series was not a comedy, but there were humorous moments, most of which 
flowed from Columbo's seeming incompetence. Is this a counterexample to the superiority 
theory? No. We find Columbo's behavior amusing because it misleads the villains into thinking 
that they are smarter than, or superior to, Columbo. We are rooting for Columbo to catch the 
murderer, so we delight in seeing him add insult to their injury by lulling them into a false sense 
of confidence. We laugh because we enjoy seeing the hero be superior to the villain; I will return 
to this point shortly. It is also worth noting that unlike Don Quixote, Barney Fife, and Gob Bluth, 
Columbo does not lack self-awareness; to a large extent, Columbo's seeming incompetence is an 
act designed to fool people into thinking that he is not capable of discovering their guilt.  
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 A further piece of evidence in favor of the superiority theory is mockery. There are 
numerous examples of mockery; I will indicate a few: children mocking each other on the 
playground; politicians being mocked on The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and Saturday 
Night Live as well as late night shows; cheesy B-movies being mocked on Mystery Science 
Theater 3000; roasts; etc. If someone catalogued the jokes in those shows and activities I 
imagine that the incongruity theory could capture some of them, but the vast majority of such 
jokes would be better explained by the superiority theory. When we mock something we see 
ourselves as superior to it (at least at that moment in time). Also, when we laugh at someone 
else's joke that is mocking someone or something we see ourselves as superior to the object of 
ridicule. At this point, it is worth noting that the superiority theory helps explain racist and sexist 
humor: the person making jokes about another race or sex views himself as superior to the target 
of the joke. I will return to this issue later when I address the ethics of humor. 
 Robert Solomon observes that while the Three Stooges might appear to be a classic 
example of the superiority theory, appearances can be deceiving.
90
 Solomon writes, "One doesn't 
walk away from the Stooges feeling superior, but, rather, released and relieved."
91
  This, 
Solomon observes, seems to be evidence that the Stooges' humor is an example of the relief 
theory.
92
 In other words, when we enjoy watching Moe, Larry, and Curly abuse each other and 
those around them, we are expressing our violent desires in a safe manner.
93
 But Solomon writes 
that although he cannot disprove that theory he thinks we should be hesitant to accept it since the 
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"Three Stooges' humor does not feel particularly vicious, and those who complain that it seems 
so are easily dismissed as those who have not allowed themselves to 'get into it.'"
94
  
 Solomon then considers if the Stooges' humor fits the incongruity theory; he decides that 
it does not since that theory fails to explain why the Stooges' get better with repeated viewings 
and why people enjoy imitating the Three Stooges.
95
 Finding that none of the three main theories 
fit, Solomon advances what the calls the inferiority theory.
96
 Solomon describes the inferiority 
theory as follows: "... laughter as the great leveler, beyond contempt or indignation, antithetical 
to pretension and pomp."
97
 Solomon claims that when we watch the Stooges "we allow ourselves 
to enter a world of miniature mayhem in which we feel as foolish as they are."
98
 After suggesting 
that the Western philosophical tradition has failed to fully appreciate humor, Solomon concludes 
his paper by writing, "Nothing is so important in philosophy or anywhere else as not taking 
oneself too seriously."
99
 
 I will return to Solomon's final point in a later section. Right now I want to address his 
suggestion of an inferiority theory. First of all, Solomon made an unfortunate word choice when 
naming his theory since he is not suggesting that we feel inferior to the Stooges when we laugh 
at them; rather, he is suggesting that we see ourselves on the same level as the Stooges: we enjoy 
being silly with them (hence, the enjoyment of imitating them). Perhaps Solomon should have 
instead dubbed his theory the egalitarian theory of humor since he views humor as placing 
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everyone on a level playing field whether they are a doctor, plumber, philosopher, or Stooge. But 
this account is not entirely true of the Three Stooges' humor. Solomon observes in his article that 
"[The Three Stooges] ridicule every profession and the world of the wealthy in particular by their 
very presence within it."
100
 In other words, the Stooges' humor pokes fun at those in superior 
social circles, but this fact does not mean that the Stooges' humor is contrary to the superiority 
theory. The superiority theory is not so much concerned with the existential circumstances of the 
joker and the object of ridicule but with the attitude of the those who find the joke funny; people 
who laugh at the Stooges because they disrupt the world of the upper class do so because they 
enjoy seeing what they view as pretense being unmasked. I do not mean to suggest that this 
explanation captures all (or even most) of the Three Stooges' humor; in fact, I think the 
incongruity theory captures a good deal of the Three Stooges' humor, but I think Solomon's 
alternative theory misses the mark because he misinterprets the superiority theory as suggesting 
that those who laugh at others must be in the superior social position.
101, 102
 Solomon is correct 
that the Stooges' presence in a hospital or a courtroom makes a mockery of that environment; the 
doctors, lawyers, judges, or any other respected figures become belittled in the process, and this 
particular aspect of the Stooges' humor is best explained by the superiority theory. 
LAUGHING AT DEATH 
 
 Cohen writes: 
To joke about death is a way of domesticating something that cannot be tamed... 
The idea of death can be terrifying, numbing, incomprehensible. Joking about it 
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returns a kind of balance. It is a way of being in charge, even of death. A way of 
being in charge of something, sometimes, is simply being able to speak about it, 
because if you can speak about it, it hasn't numbed you completely, hasn't robbed 
you of everything.
103
 
 
Cohen does not mention the superiority theory in connection with this; in fact, he dismisses the 
superiority theory in an earlier paragraph on that same page. But I think the superiority theory 
plays an important role in explaining why people joke about death: they joke about it because not 
even something as final and nullifying as death can conquer their spirits. 
 One fictional character who subverts the gravity of death through the use of humor is 
James Bond. When Bond has been captured by his enemies and is facing an imminent death, he 
usually makes a quip. One of Cohen's objections to the superiority theory was that although 
people in superior positions joke about their inferiors the opposite is often true (he mentions 
Jews joking about Germans in the 1930s and 1940s).
104
 Although in these near-death situations 
Bond is in an inferior position to his captors, his quips still fall under the superiority theory 
because he is asserting his superiority over the villains through humor. There is a subversive 
element to humor, and that element is being utilized in these situations. This element is best 
brought out by way of contrast. For a moment, imagine Bond in a similar scenario; but instead of 
having a flippant attitude toward his captors, he is whimpering and fear-struck—if that were his 
attitude, then he would be evincing his captors' superiority over him both in terms of body and 
spirit. But that is not Bond's attitude. By being flippant about the situation, he undercuts the 
(temporary) victory of his captors: they might have his body, but they do not have his soul; 
similarly, the Jews in Nazi Germany who made jokes about Nazis manifested the same attitude: 
the Nazis might take their property and incarcerate them, but the Nazis could not touch their 
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souls.
105
 With the case of Bond, not only is he having a laugh at his captor's expense but the 
audience is laughing along with him because they enjoy seeing the hero assert his superiority 
over the villain.  
 One can also laugh at a hero triumphing over a villain even when the hero is not joking. 
In The Count of Monte Cristo the Count, disguised as an abbot, confronts one of the men, 
Caderousse, who ruined his life years ago. Near the beginning of this encounter, Caderousse 
proclaims that he does not believe in God; but after the Count reveals his true identity—that he is 
Edmond Dantès, the man who Caderousse allowed to be wronged all those years ago—
Caderousse starts praying to God begging for forgiveness right before the Count kills him. This 
is not a humorous scene in any typical sense: it is a serious scene in an adventure novel. But 
when I first read the book I laughed out loud at this scene, and while writing this paragraph I 
have been smiling because I take great pleasure in seeing the evil Caderousse get his just deserts. 
What this reveals is that individuals can delight in the superiority of others (in this case the 
Count) so long as they approve of that person's action. Instances of laughter classed under the 
superiority theory need not be instances of an individual laughing at his or her superiority over 
someone or something; rather, an individual can instead delight in the triumph of others. In other 
words, Hobbes is wrong; personal triumph is not an integral part of the superiority theory: 
individuals can delight in the triumph of good over evil. 
 Some of my readers might object to me using fictional characters as evidence that one 
can laugh in the face of death, so I present some real-life examples of humorous last words. 
When Voltaire was on his deathbed a priest asked him to renounce Satan; Voltaire replied, 
                                                             
 105 No doubt many Jews lost their sense of humor in such ghastly and horrible circumstances. In light of 
what I say in the next section, I would like to emphasize the fact that I do not think that any Jews who lost their 
sense of humor in those circumstances are any less moral for having done so. The horror they went through is 
unfathomable and far beyond the difficult circumstances which I utilize as examples in this essay. 
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"Now, now my good man, this is no time for making enemies."
106
 Groucho Marx supposedly 
said, "Die my dear? Why that's the last thing I'll do!"
107
 John Maynard Keynes purportedly said, 
"I wish I'd drunk more champagne."
108
 There are many more witty last words (all of somewhat 
dubious authenticity, might I add); but what matters here is not so much the historical 
authenticity of those famous last words but their popular appeal. The appeal of these quotes lies 
in the fact that by getting the "last word" these individuals are asserting their superiority over 
death. These individuals did, of course, die; but what is important is that they died without fear; 
they faced life's final obstacle as if it were nothing to them. 
 The attitude one adopts when joking in the face of death is reminiscent of Aristotle's 
great-souled man. The following is one of the ways Aristotle describes the great-souled man: 
"And it would be most unbecoming for a proud man to fly from danger, swinging his arms by his 
sides, or to wrong another; for to what end should he do disgraceful acts, he to whom nothing is 
great?" (Nicomachean Ethics IV.3 1123b31-3).
109
 Those last words, "he to whom nothing is 
great," really stand out as representative of the attitude a person possesses when joking in the 
face of death; they do not regard death as anything great. I will explore the connection between 
humor and the great-souled man in further detail in the section on the ethics of humor. 
 Before that, however, I want to present a criticism that Simon Critchley has raised against 
the type of laughter I have been presenting. Critchley writes, "... the heroic laughter that rails in 
the face of the firing squad – 'Go ahead, shoot me, I don't care'. [sic] This is the laughter that I 
                                                             
 106 John H. Lienhard, "No. 2077: Last Words," The Engines of our Ingenuity, accessed April 7, 2013, 
http://www.uh.edu/engines/epi2077.htm. 
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 Ibid. 
 
 108 David Smith, "Famous Last Words," Mapping, accessed April 7, 2013, 
http://www.mapping.com/words.shtml. 
 
 109 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1773. 
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always suspect of emanating from the mountain tops, from the cool summits of lofty isolation. 
This is precisely a manic laughter in Freud's sense: solitary, juvenile, perverse, verging on 
sobbing. This is the ego bloated and triumphant in empty solitude and infantile dreams of 
omnipotence."
110
 Critchley's criticism of this type of laughter rests upon his acceptance of 
Freud's theory of psychology, a critique of which lies beyond the scope of this paper. But the 
essence of Critchley's criticism is that in such scenarios the person who laughs is feigning 
courage. I respond that if the individual is feigning courage, then he is only imitating the great-
souled man. While such behavior is not as worthy of honor as genuine courage in the face of 
danger, I do regard it as worthy of some honor since the individual is attempting to be virtuous 
(but falling short of the mark). Although this person falls short of the mark, he or she is far closer 
to the virtuous ideal than the coward who whimpers in such a situation. 
  
                                                             
 110 Critchley, On Humor, 105. 
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VI. JUBILANT LAUGHTER 
 
 One type of laughter that, surprisingly, is not referenced in the literature is what I shall 
term jubilant laughter. I define jubilant laughter as laughter that is a celebration of greatness. An 
example of jubilant laughter would be the following: sometimes when I am listening to a piece of 
music that I cherish, I laugh; I laugh because of the admiration that I have for the work of art 
(and the artist who created it). This type of laughter is a celebration of life. It is laughter that 
expresses this sentiment: "Life is great. Life is worth living." There are many other occasions 
when I have experienced such laughter. I have laughed when "all is right with the world." I have 
laughed when contemplating a great person or a great achievement. These instances of laughter 
are not related to humor in the sense that humor is defined as something that is comical or funny, 
but I do think this type of laughter does relate to humor in the sense that a person can be said to 
be "in good humor." I do not want to be accused of the fallacy of equivocation; I admit that these 
two uses of the word humor have different definitions. But I still think there is a relation, for that 
which is comical or funny invokes a certain mood or humor. 
 Someone might suggest that jubilant laughter falls under the incongruity theory; one 
laughs at these things because they are the exception: great achievements and sublime moments 
are rare. Not only is this possible interpretation horribly pessimistic, it fails to capture why one 
laughs in these cases; we do not laugh because the thing in question defies our expectations. On 
the contrary, if the piece of music has been heard before, then one knows what to expect when 
listening to it. But if one did think that great and wonderful moments in life were terribly 
incongruous with the rest of life, then one's reaction would not be jubilant laughter but rather 
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sadness since on this account life is a "vale of tears." Many people do have such a reaction to 
joyous moments, and this is manifest in the phenomenon known as "tears of joy." These people 
cry at the sight of joyous moments because these joyous moments stand in contrast to what they 
perceive to be the everyday nature of life.
111
 Having "tears of joy" is not the ideal reaction to 
joyous moments; it is better to react with jubilant laughter since jubilant laughter presupposes an 
optimistic view of life—a view which I think is correct. 
 This type of laughter is triumphant; it is triumphant in the following sense: "If this is 
possible, then the rest does not matter." When one is laughing jubilantly that which is evil, 
painful, upsetting, etc. melts away; those things seem terribly unimportant. Jubilant laughter is 
life-affirming. 
 This triumphant quality of jubilant laughter leads me to propose that it is related to the 
type of laughter that one sees in the superiority theory. Under the superiority theory, one laughs 
triumphantly at someone or something because one is better than (or has bested) that person or 
thing. With jubilant laughter, one laughs triumphantly because the evil in the world is 
insignificant in comparison to the good (or perhaps one could say that good is superior to evil).  
 But there are two significant differences between these two types of laughter. First, when 
I laugh jubilantly because of something, I do not regard myself as superior to that thing; in fact, 
the opposite is often true. In many cases, the achievement which I admire is something that I 
cannot equal. But this is not to say that I feel inferior to the object of my admiration; the focus of 
this occurrence is not me comparing myself to the object. In the moment I am focused on the 
object of admiration, not a comparison of myself and the object.   
                                                             
 111 I am engaging in a bit of armchair psychologizing which is risky business, so allow me to add a 
disclaimer: it is quite possible that some (or perhaps even most) people who shed tears of joy have an optimistic 
view of laugh that is entirely compatible with jubilant laughter; in that case, my example fails. But if there are a few 
people for whom this analysis holds true, then those individuals stand in contrast to the individuals who jubilantly 
laugh at joyous moments. 
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 A more important difference is that under the superiority theory, there is an element of 
malice in the humor; the focus is on the negative (e.g. one laughs at another person's stupidity). 
Although laughing at death is far less malicious than mockery, there is still a focus on the 
negative: namely the looming specter of death. But jubilant laughter is malice-free; with jubilant 
laughter, the focus is on the positive. Socrates said that comedy was an admixture of pleasure 
and pain; but this is not true of jubilant laughter: it is free of pain. There is not a sharp divide 
between jubilant laughter and laughter under the superiority theory; rather, there is a continuum 
with very malicious laughter on one end and malice-free laughter on the other end.
112
 Cases such 
as laughing at death lie somewhere in the middle. 
  
                                                             
 112 Jubilant laughter and laughter under the superiority theory lie along the same continuum because they 
both possess a triumphant characteristic. 
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VII. THE ETHICS OF HUMOR 
 
 Joking about death and joking in the face of other adverse circumstances is admirable 
because it is indicative of two virtues: courage and wit. Instead of cowering, the great-souled 
man faces adverse circumstance with calm; but, even more than that, he displays his calm not 
only in outward appearance but through his jest: this shows that his mind is calm and his outlook 
is hopeful as well. This is not to say that the great-souled man does not take death seriously; 
joking in this context does not indicate indifference or resignation. Instead, humor is used to 
assert his greatness. 
 There are some other cues we can take from the great-souled man in reference to the 
ethics of humor. Aristotle writes, "For the proud man despises justly (since he thinks truly), but 
the many do so at random" (1124b5).
113
 This idea can be applied to humor in the following 
manner: the just man mocks those who deserve to be mocked instead of mocking just anybody. 
Of course, this raises the following question: who deserves to be mocked? The simple answer to 
this complex question is that evil people deserve to be mocked while virtuous people do not. As I 
indicated earlier in the paper, humor can be used as a corrective; in such cases, one must aim at 
the good, and in this case the good is getting the person to realize her vice in such a way as to 
gently prod her towards virtue. 
 In connection with the last point, there is at least one more aspect of Aristotle's 
description of the great-souled man that can be applied to the ethics of humor: "... for it is a 
                                                             
 113 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1774. 
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difficult and lofty thing to be superior to the former ['people who enjoy high position and good 
fortune'], but easy to do so to the latter [the middle class], and a lofty bearing over the former is 
no mark of ill-breeding, but among humble people it is as vulgar as a display of strength against 
the weak" (1124b20-22).
114
 This passage can be adapted to apply to the ethics of humor in the 
following way: do not mock easy targets because that is an easy task and easy tasks are not for 
the great-souled man; instead, one should mock those who are one's equals or are in a higher 
position than oneself and who deserve to be mocked. 
 Critchley, Cohen, and Solomon all regarded laughing at oneself as both good and 
important. I disagree. I am afraid that I am quite liable to be misunderstood on this point, so I 
want to clarify that I am not opposed to self-deprecatory humor. I do not think that a person 
should never laugh at himself and always regard himself and his affairs with the utmost 
solemnity. What I am opposed to is best expressed by the following quote from Critchley: "[this 
type of] laughter insists that life is not something to be affirmed ecstatically, but acknowledged 
comically."
115
 He goes onto write that such laughter "arises out of a palpable sense of inability, 
impotence, and inauthenticity."
116, 117
 While Critchley writes of such nihilistic laughter 
approvingly, it is profoundly immoral since life is the root of value and the rational human 
being's life is the standard of value (for a human).
118
 To regard not any specific life but rather life 
                                                             
 114 Ibid., 1775. 
 
 115 Critchley, On Humor, 106. 
 
 116 Ibid. 
 
 117 Although Cohen and Solomon regard laughing at oneself as a good thing, they do not express this view 
in the virulent way Critchley does. The quotes express Critchley's views, not theirs; and it is this strong view of 
Critchley's that I am arguing against. 
 
 118 It is far beyond the scope of this paper to present and defend my views on ethics, so I shall instead have 
to refer readers to the following work which best represents my views on the subject: Tara Smith, Viable Values: A 
Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality (United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2000). 
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in general as comical (i.e. absurd, foolish, ridiculous, etc.) is to attack all values. The moral 
person ought to affirm life ecstatically, and as a result she ought to take her life very seriously. 
But this is not to say that the moral person should not laugh at herself if, for example, she makes 
a harmless mistake such as looking around the house for her glasses only to discover that the 
glasses have been resting atop her head the entire time; in cases such as that, it is perfectly alright 
to laugh at oneself because incidents such as that are not very important. But to regard one's life, 
one's achievements, or one's values as a joke is to commit moral treason. 
 I am now going to turn my attention to racist and sexist humor. These types of jokes can 
perhaps be explained by the incongruity theory: someone ascribes a characteristic to the class; 
that characteristic is not descriptive of the group; and so the two are incongruous.
119
 But on the 
incongruity theory it is difficult to see why these jokes are immoral when other instances of 
incongruous humor are moral (or at least morally neutral). On the superiority theory, however, it 
is much easier to see why these jokes are vicious: those who tell them / laugh at them are 
attempting to assert superiority over the object of the joke.
120
 This is immoral since superiority 
and inferiority are about virtue not race or gender; also, virtue (of a lack thereof) is a property of 
an individual, not a group. 
 The above comments apply to instances of jokes/humor that are subsumed under the 
superiority theory. I am not going to go into any detail on the ethics of humor where it applies to 
instances of the incongruity theory since I think that instances of humor that fall under that 
classification are largely morally neutral (e.g. Groucho's line when one of the other Marx 
                                                             
 119 One might object that what is malicious about racist and sexist jokes is that group does actually possess 
the characteristic ascribed to them by the joke. If this is the case, then that is a knock against the incongruity theory 
and further evidence in favor of the superiority theory's take on these types of jokes. 
 
 120 This has been noted by Critchley and others. 
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brothers is about to throw a telephone: "Don't throw that phone! That one's for long distances."), 
so whether or not one should tell such a joke is more a matter of tact than morality.
121
 
  
                                                             
 121 Tact could be viewed as an aspect of morality, but that level of detail lies outside the scope of this paper. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper defended the superiority theory of humor by pointing to various examples of 
humor that the superiority theory explains better than the popular incongruity theory. This paper 
also defended the superiority theory against criticisms of it posed by various authors and offered 
criticisms of the popular incongruity theory. This paper also explicated a related type of laughter 
termed jubilant laughter: laughter that is celebratory of the good. A connection between the 
superiority theory of laughter and Aristotle's great-souled man was then demonstrated. Finally, 
cues were taken from Aristotle's account of the great-souled man in regard to the ethical 
implications of the superiority theory. 
 In the past, humor did not receive as much attention from philosophers as it should have. 
Thankfully, there has been a sharp increase of interest in this topic in the last few decades. It is 
unfortunate that the superiority theory has been ignored and/or unfairly criticized for the past few 
hundred years; I hope this paper will help remedy that situation. 
 During the past few months as I have been thinking a lot about this topic, I developed the 
habit of often introspecting after I laughed or found something amusing and questioning why I 
laughed; the superiority theory or the incongruity theory often explained these cases, but 
occasionally I could not discover an explanation for my laughter. This is at least one indication 
that there is still much work to be done in the philosophy of humor.  
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